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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution inevitably must be interpreted. There are
countless issues-such as whether the president can fire cabinet
officials' or rescind treaties2 or assert executive privilegeawhere the document is silent, but a constitutional answer is necessary. So much of the Constitution is written in broad language
that must be given meaning and applied to specific situations.
What is "Commerce ... among the several States"N or 'liberty"B or

"cruel and unusual punishments"6 or "equal protection of the
laws"7-and countless other phrases-must be defined and applied. The assurances of freedom and equality in the Constitution
are not absolute,8 and it is necessary to decide what justifications
t Founding Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of CaliforniaIrvine School of Law.
1 See Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 134 (1926).
2 See Goldwater v Carter,444 US 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist concurring in denial of
certiorari) (positing that a challenge to the president's rescinding a treaty was nonjusticiable).
3 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 706 (1974) (holding that the president may
invoke executive privilege, but it must yield to other overriding needs for information).
4 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3. See United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 567-68 (1995)
(holding that the Gun Free School Zone Act, prohibiting firearms within one-thousand
feet of a school, exceeded the scope of Congress's Commerce Power).
5 US Const Amend XIV, § 1. See Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 53 (1905) (finding freedom of contract to be a liberty interest protected by the Constitution).
6 US Const Amend VIII. See Ewing v California,538 US 11, 30-31 (2003) (holding that
a sentence of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting was not cruel and unusual punishment).
7 US Const Amend XIV, § 1. See Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US
483, 495 (1954) (holding that separate can never be equal in public education).
8 See Schenck v United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919) (holding that freedom of
speech is not absolute); Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 612 (1974) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require "absolute equality").
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are sufficient to allow the government to infringe rights or discriminate. Obviously, for all of these reasons, courts must interpret the Constitution, but so must all government officials, all of
whom take an oath to uphold the Constitution.9
A constitutional theory is an approach that is used to interpret and give meaning to the Constitution. Over the last few decades, two competing constitutional theories have been originalism
and nonoriginalism. Originalists believe that the meaning of a
constitutional provision is fixed at the time of its adoption and is
changeable only by constitutional amendment.1o Under this view,
Article I of the Constitution means the same thing as it did in
1787 or the First Amendment means the same thing as it did in
1791, and nothing that has happened since should matter in deciding their meanings. By contrast, nonoriginalists believe that
the Constitution's meaning evolves by both interpretation and by
amendment; loosely speaking, nonoriginalists believe in a 1iving
Constitution."" Of course, there are many variants of each of
these approaches, and there are other constitutional theories as
well. There is a huge scholarly literature debating these and other theories of constitutional interpretation.12
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a former law professor and a
highly respected judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, has written a provocative book arguing
against constitutional theory. In it, he identifies several of the
most prominent constitutional theories and presents powerful
critiques of them. He concludes that "[w]hat's needed is not yet
9 See US Const Art II, § 1, cl 7 (requiring the president to swear an oath to uphold
the Constitution); US Const Art VI, cl 3 (requiring senators, representatives, state legislators, and state executives to swear to uphold the Constitution); 5 USC § 3331 (requiring civil servants and members of the military to swear to defend and remain faithful to
the Constitution).
10 See Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Speech before the American Bar Associa-

tion: Washington, D.C., July 9, 1985, in Steven G. Calabresi, ed, Originalism:A Quarter
Century of Debate 47, 54 (Regnery 2007) (collecting essays advocating originalism and
presenting a discussion of arguments for and against it).

11 See Howard Lee McBain, The Living Constitution: A Considerationof the Realities and Legends of Our Fundamental Law 272 (Macmillan 1928). See also Charles A.
Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in Stephen Parks Strickland, ed,

Hugo Black and the Supreme Court: A Symposium 133, 141 (Bobbs-Merrill 1967).
12

See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduc-

tion of the Law (Free Press 1990); Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A CriticalAnalysis of ConstitutionalLaw (Harvard 1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, Interpreting the Consti-

tution (Praeger 1987); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review (Harvard 1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human

Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary
(Yale 1982).
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another theory but an escape from theorizing" (p 115). He contends that constitutional theories have been harmful to democratic governance. He says that "the theories are taking us down
the road to judicial hegemony where the self-governance at the
heart of our political order cannot thrive" (p 4).
In one sense, Judge Wilkinson is surely correct. Throughout
American history, justices and judges have decided cases without having a "cosmic constitutional theory."13 In deciding constitutional cases, courts always look at the Constitution's text
(which rarely provides answers), the Framers' intent (if any can
be ascertained), the structure of the Constitution, precedent,
and social needs. The vast majority of constitutional cases have
been decided without any invocation of a constitutional theory.
Moreover, no theory ever has been developed for deciding what
is a "compelling" or an "important" or a "legitimate" government
interest, even though such determinations are at the core of litigation about individual rights and equal protection.16 No theory
exists for deciding what is an "unreasonable" search or arrest,
even though judges in courts across the country make that determination countless times every day.16
Yet, in another sense, Judge Wilkinson is profoundly wrong
because there is simply no way to avoid a constitutional theory
in deciding, or having views on, constitutional issues. Justices
and judges-and executives and legislators-need to decide how
they will go about giving the Constitution meaning. For example, as explained above, a fundamental question is whether the
meaning of a constitutional provision is fixed when it is adopted
13 For example, prominent recent cases have been decided without reference to or
invocation of constitutional theory, such as NationalFederation of Independent Business
v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566 (2012) (concluding, without express reference to any constitutional theory, that the (1) Affordable Care Act's (ACA) minimum coverage provision is
constitutional under Congress's Taxing Power, (2) ACA's Medicaid expansion exceeds the
scope of Congress's conditional Spending Power, but (3) proper remedy is to prohibit the
federal government from withdrawing all pre-ACA Medicaid funding).
14
See, for example, Miller v Alabama, 132 S Ct 2455, 2463-64 (2012) (reasoning
from two lines of precedent in holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory
life sentences for juveniles); PleasantGrove City, Utah v Summum, 555 US 460, 467-68
(2009) (reasoning from precedent and public policy in deciding that the First Amendment
does not bar a city government's decision not to erect a monument donated by a very
small religious group).
15 See Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 Penn St L
Rev 139, 140 (2012). But see generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal L Rev 297 (1997).
16 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175,
1186 (1989).
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or whether its meaning can evolve by interpretation; this determines what materials and what arguments are even relevant in
interpreting a constitutional provision. In deciding what is cruel
and unusual punishment, should the focus be solely on what the
Framers deemed objectionable or should the inquiry be about
"evolving standards of decency"?17 There is no way to avoid that
question, and whatever the answer, that is a constitutional theory. More generally, there needs to be an approach to deciding
when courts should defer to the political process and when they
should overrule it.18 This, too, is a constitutional theory. Judge
Wilkinson's underlying thesis-that constitutional theory is unnecessary and harmful (p 4)-is wrong because constitutional
theory is inescapable.
This Review is divided into three parts. First, I briefly
summarize Judge Wilkinson's argument. Second, I argue that
despite his protestations to the contrary, Judge Wilkinson has a
constitutional theory; it is one that calls for great judicial deference to the elected branches of government. Third, I contend
that Judge Wilkinson's theory is neither defended nor desirable.
I. AGAINST COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Judge Wilkinson's book is only 116 pages long. There is a
short introduction and five chapters. The first four chapters each
identify a major constitutional theory and then proceed to criticize it. The last chapter, "The Failure of Cosmic Constitutional
Theory," presents his conclusion: constitutional theory causes
judges to overrule democratically elected branches of government, and this is undesirable (p 115). He says, "I fear that democratic liberty will more and more become the victim of cosmic
theory's triumphal rise" (p 114).
That is the central thesis of his book: constitutional theory
tells judges when it is permissible for them to overrule the decisions of popularly elected legislatures and executives and therefore makes it more likely that judges will do so (pp 6-7). This is
undesirable because judges' overruling the decisions of elected
officials is inconsistent with democracy.19 At the beginning of the
book, Judge Wilkinson writes, "The great casualty of cosmic
Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (1958).
See, for example, Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 Yale L J 1329, 1330-32 (2005).
19 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 16-23 (Yale 2d ed 1986).
17
18
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constitutional theory has been our inalienable right of selfgovernance. . . . Moreover, theory's siege on self-governance is

hardly complete" (p 9). He says that "[c]ontemporary issues"
such as challenges to bans on marriage equality for gays and
lesbians20 and to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act21 have "done little to assuage the larger fear that courts will
use their own preferences to resolve our most volatile political
controversies and that democratic liberty will once again be
compromised" (p 9).
Judge Wilkinson develops this point by looking at four major constitutional theories. The title of Chapter 1-"Living Constitutionalism: Activism Unleashed"-expresses his view of the
idea of a "living" Constitution. He identifies Justice William
Brennan as a leading proponent of living constitutionalism and
says,

Brennan and other living constitutionalists led the courts
deep into the thickets of abortion, capital punishment, and
habeas corpus. They endowed trial courts with broad authority over local school administration, extended the realm
of constitutional tort at the expense of state and local governance, and were poised to confer broad constitutional protections on economic entitlements as well (pp 11-12).
He concludes, "In short, the influence of living constitutionalism
has been exceeded only by the cumulative damage to democratic
liberty that it inflicted" (p 12).
As with each theory, he begins by acknowledging the benefits of living constitutionalism-such as Brown v Board of Education of Topeka22 and rulings equipping Congress with the
needed authority to regulate interstate commerce in a complex,
modern economy (p 19).23 But he then sharply criticizes living
constitutionalism and says that "both in theory and in practice,
[it] has elevated judicial hubris over humility, boldness over
modesty, and intervention over restraint" (p 19).

20 See, for example, Windsor v United States, 699 F3d 169, 188 (2d Cir 2012), cert
granted, 2012 WL 4009654; Perry v Brown, 671 F3d 1052, 1095 (9th Cir 2012), cert
granted as Hollingsworth v Perry, 2012 WL 3134429.
21 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
22 347 US 483 (1954).
23 See, for example, United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy concurring) (explaining that the United States has transitioned to a single national market);
Wickard v Filburn,317 US 111, 127-28 (1942).
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He argues that courts are less well-suited than legislatures
to adapt to modern needs and says that "living constitutionalism, at least in [Brennan's] incarnation, suffers from the vice of
institutional blindness that all too commonly afflicts judicial activism" (p 22). He argues that legislatures are "the superior updater" (p 23). As an example, he strongly objects to the Supreme
Court's decision in 2011 affirming a lower court decision ordering
the release of inmates from a California prison as a remedy for
tremendous overcrowding that was found to have caused deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates.24 He says that
the legislature, much more than the judiciary, should decide what
is best for society in this regard. He objects that "the capacious
language of the constitutional vessel simply provides too much
temptation for judges to pour their own beliefs in" (p 27).
The title of Chapter 2 again captures Judge Wilkinson's argument: "Originalism: Activism Masquerading as Restraint."
Judge Wilkinson relies on a famous article by Judge Robert
Bork as his basis for explaining originalism.25 He identifies the
virtues of originalism and writes,
The virtues of originalism are real, and they should not be
cast aside because the theory is ultimately wanting. These
virtues include providing judicial constraints; harnessing
the judiciary's expertise in traditional legal analysis; offering a coherent justification for the judiciary's democratic legitimacy; and enjoying, at least on a basic level, a good
measure of acceptance (p 39).
But Judge Wilkinson then criticizes originalism because it,
too, is used by courts to overturn the decisions of popularly
elected government officials. He writes, "A sad fact nonetheless
lies at originalism's heart. For all its virtues, originalism has
failed to deliver on its promise of restraint. Activism still characterizes many a judicial decision, and originalist judges have
been among the worst offenders" (p 46).
He says that "[t]he chief failure of originalism is that the
search for original understanding often fails to constrain judicial
choices" (p 46). The reality is that the historical record is generally so incomplete and inconsistent that judges can come to almost

24
25

See Brown v Plata, 131 S Ct 1910, 1945-46 (2011).
See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind L J 1 (1971).
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any conclusion and justify it in originalist terms. 6 Moreover, he
says that "[e]ven where there is a digestible quantity of coherent
historical evidence, it is. often difficult for judges to reconstruct
the past" (p 50). Originalism requires an arbitrary choice as to
the level of abstraction at which to describe the original understanding of a constitutional provision (pp 52-53). For example,
was the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment about protecting former slaves, or
about protecting those of African descent, or about protecting all
racial minorities, or about protecting all historically disadvantaged groups, or about protecting all who have been unfairly discriminated against by the government (p 52)? Any of these can
claim to be the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause,
but the choice is hugely important, such as in determining
whether women are protected from discrimination.27
Judge Wilkinson points out that all justices and judges sometimes must reject originalism because it leads to unacceptable results (p 54).28 He calls this "hot-and-cold originalism" and says
that even the justices who most profess to be originalists, such as
Justice Antonin Scalia, are guilty of this (pp 54-55).29

He criticizes originalism when it leads to "judicial activism"
(p 46). He writes that "[r]ecently originalism has provided cover
for episodic activism" (p 57). He says, "What is immensely sad is
that a theory that was boldly advertised at its inception as a
constraining force on the judiciary has been hijacked for unrestrained incursions" (p 57). His primary example of this is the
Court's decision in District of Columbia v Heller,30 which found
that the Second Amendment protects a right of individuals to
possess firearms and struck down a District of Columbia law
prohibiting private ownership or possession of handguns.3' He
writes, "Disenfranchising democratic majorities across the nation
by the narrowest of judicial margins was troubling enough. To do
so on the basis of the ambiguous language and inconclusive history of the Second Amendment compounded the difficulties" (p 58).

26
See John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional
Interpretation,31 U Chi L Rev 502, 508-09 (1964).
27 See, for example, Bradwell v Illinois, 83 US (16 Wall) 130 (1872) (denying women
protection under the Equal Protection Clause).
28
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849, 861-62 (1989).
29
See, for example, Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296, 302-08 (2004) (Scalia).
3o
554 US 570 (2008).
31 Id at 595.
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He accuses the Court's majority of "substitut[ing] their own preferences for those of the Constitution" (p 58).
In Chapter 3, Judge Wilkinson discusses political process
theory. He centers especially on the writings of the late Professor John Hart Ely.32 Professor Ely argued that the judiciary's focus should be on the processes of government, with substantive
choices left to the political process.33 In essence, Professor Ely
would allow judges to be nonoriginalists so long as they were
dealing with issues of process, but to be originalists when dealing with substantive constitutional questions.
As with the other theories, Judge Wilkinson criticizes process-based judicial review on the ground that it would allow
judges to decide cases based on their own views and values. He
writes, "Rather than eschewing value judgments, Ely's theory
requires judges to make substantive determinations about the
nature of American democracy and the wisdom of law" (p 62).
After describing process theory, Judge Wilkinson explains its
virtues, focusing attention on the importance of process (pp 6569). Like Judge Wilkinson, Professor Ely defined democracy as
majority rule,34 and Judge Wilkinson commends his "devotion to
representative democracy" (p 68). He praises Professor Ely for
recognizing that judges undermine democracy when they substitute their own views for those of elected officials (p 69).
But he then criticizes Professor Ely's theory for allowing
judges to make value choices in defining the processes required
by the Constitution. He says that "procedural judgments can be
every bit as subjective and consequential as substantive ones"
(p 71). He says that the "number of value judgments involved in
'[p]olicing the [p]rocess of [r]epresentation' is enough to cast a
shadow over Ely's promises of judicial restraint" (p 74) (alterations in original). Judge Wilkinson points out that the line between process and substance is inherently arbitrary and that
substantive issues-like marriage equality for gays and lesbians-might be analyzed in process terms (pp 74-77).35
Judge Wilkinson concludes his analysis of process theory by
arguing that it is not supported by the Constitution; the Constitution gives judges no special role with regard to the processes of
32

33
34
35

See generally Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 12).
Id at 181-83.
See id at 4-5.
See also Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitu-

tional Theories, 89 Yale L J 1063, 1065 (1980).
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government (pp 78-79). Judge Wilkinson ends this chapter by
stating, "In short, process theory can be viewed as exactly the
opposite of what it is advertised to be. It is a prescription for an
emboldened judicial role unsupported by the Constitution and
covered by little more than a fig leaf of restraint" (p 79).
Chapter 4 is entitled, "Pragmatism: Activism through Antitheory." Judge Wilkinson here focuses on the writings of Judge
Richard Posner.36 After describing pragmatism, Judge Wilkinson
explains its virtues (pp 84-87). He says that it provides adjudicative flexibility. As an example, he agrees with Judge Posner in
praising Justice Stephen Breyer's opinion in Van Orden v Perry,3 7 finding that a six-foot-high, three-foot-wide Ten Commandments monument at the corner between the Texas State
Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court did not violate the First
Amendment.38 He says that the view of the four dissenting justices would have been "disastrous" (p 85). Judge Wilkinson also
praises pragmatism for reminding judges of their own limitations and for being honest about what judges actually do in deciding cases (p 86).
But Judge Wilkinson says that the flaw with pragmatism is
that "it puts great power in judges' hands and tells them precious
little about what to do with it" (p 88). The balancing that is inherent in pragmatism allows judges discretion to decide what to
weigh, and inevitably the weighing is the product of the views of
the judges (p 92). Judge Wilkinson says that pragmatism is the
"[a]ntithesis of [riestraint" (p 94). He says that "[p]ragmatism
cuts the bonds to representative institutions by making adherence to enacted law a matter of practical convenience rather than
democratic obligation" (p 95). He criticizes pragmatism for giving
judges an "immense policymaking role" (p 95).
Finally, in the last chapter, Judge Wilkinson expressly defends "judicial restraint" (pp 104-05). He explains that judges
are not elected and not accountable (p 105). When judges declare
executive and legislative actions unconstitutional they are displacing the choices of officials who are elected and electorally accountable (p 106). The constitutional decisions of the Supreme
Court cannot be changed except by constitutional amendment or
See generally Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard 2008).
545 US 677 (2005).
Id at 699 (Breyer concurring). I should disclose that I argued this case in the Supreme Court, on the losing side, contending that such a clear religious message at the
seat of state government violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
36
37
38
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by a later Court ruling (p 107); the dangers of judicial errors are
thus much greater (p 107). Judge Wilkinson emphasizes the antidemocratic dangers of judicial review and he writes, "The more
promiscuous forms of constitutional adjudication threaten to
fracture the American social compact in the most elemental
way" (p 107).
Judge Wilkinson's solution then is judicial restraint. He
says that "[t]he republican virtue of restraint requires no cosmic
theory" (p 107). He denies having or needing a constitutional
theory. On the last page of the book, he writes, "So what is my
theory? The answer is I have no theory" (p 116).
II. JUDGE WILKINSON'S CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The thesis of Judge Wilkinson's book is that constitutional
theory is unnecessary and undesirable. But a key flaw in Judge
Wilkinson's analysis is his failure to recognize that constitutional theory is inescapable and that, therefore, contrary to his protestations, he has a constitutional theory. His constitutional
theory is one of great judicial deference to the decisions of the
elected branches of government (pp 104-06). His constitutional
theory is that American democracy means majority rule and
that judicial invalidation of the acts of popularly elected government officials is impermissible. Although he never acknowledges that this is a constitutional theory, it is exactly that. It is
an approach that courts should use in giving meaning to the
Constitution and in deciding cases.39 Moreover, he is arguing for
a constitutional theory in which judges do not impose their own
values in deciding cases (pp 20, 52, 72, 88).
It is a theory of judicial review that Judge Wilkinson captures in one word that he repeatedly uses and extolls: "restraint"
(pp 31, 46, 60, 103). Judge Wilkinson declares, "It would thus
take an extreme blindness not to discern that judicial restraint
is a bedrock principle of America's founding" (p 105). Judge Wilkinson's theory of judicial review, repeatedly expressed, is that
judicial restraint is good and judicial activism is bad, though
neither of these terms is ever explicitly defined.

39 For a definition of "constitutional theory," see Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 NYU L Rev 1, 1 (1998) ("Constitutional theory ... is the effort to develop a generally accepted theory to guide the interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States.").
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Throughout the entire book, Judge Wilkinson expresses his
constitutional theory of judicial deference to the elected branches of government. In his Introduction, he states,
In short, cosmic constitutional theory has done real damage
to the rule of law, the role of courts in our society, and the
ideals of restraint that the greatest judges in our country
once embraced. But the worst damage of all has been to democracy itself, which theory has emboldened judges to displace (p 4).
This emphasis on democracy as majority rule, and judicial review
being inconsistent with it, is expressed in every chapter in the
book. Judge Wilkinson's central objection to living constitutionalism is that it has unelected judges usurping the choices of popularly elected officials (pp 20-22). He says that living constitutionalism "at heart is anti-democratic" (p 20) (quotation marks
omitted). He declares, "In short, living constitutionalism is a complete inversion of democratic primacy and turns the Constitution's foremost premise of popular governance on its head" (p 20).
Judge Wilkinson defends his constitutional theory of judicial
deference by extolling the virtues of the democratic process. He
writes, "When a court declares certain rights or powers beyond
the legislative capacity, Americans can no longer attempt to persuade their fellow citizens on these issues in the legislative arena and can no longer enjoy the intellectual and psychic satisfactions of reasoned republican self-rule" (p 26).
Judge Wilkinson's constitutional theory is evident in his
criticism of Roe v Wade.40 He says that decision "flunked simultaneously the three most basic interpretive tests": it is not based
on the text of the Constitution, nothing in the structure of the
Constitution indicates that judges were to substitute their views
for the legislatures', and nothing in the Framers' intent suggests
that they meant to protect such a right (p 28). In other words,
Judge Wilkinson does have a constitutional theory and "interpretive tests"; under this constitutional theory, a court is justified in protecting a right under the Constitution only if it is in
the text or clearly intended by the Framers, or if there is something in the structure of the Constitution which indicates that it
is a matter for judicial protection. This theory is remarkably like

40 410 US 113 (1973).
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originalism, though he never recognizes this or acknowledges
that he has made a traditional originalist critique of Roe. 41
Throughout the book, he defends a constitutional theory
that does not allow judges' personal policy preferences to be used
in deciding cases. In Chapter 2, for example, in criticizing
originalism, he explains the uncertainty of historical records and
of the choice of the level of abstraction at which to describe the
original understanding. He says "[t]he result is even more uncertainty, which creates even more space for judicial discretion.
And in these spaces personal policy preferences sneak into law,
with originalism covering their trail" (p 53). He observes that
"[j]udges lifted high by the lofty promises of originalism are laid
bare to the insidious temptations of personal preference" (p 57).
In other words, once more, Judge Wilkinson is clear that he has
a theory of judicial review: one in which justices' "personal preferences" play no role in decisions.42
In Chapter 3, in discussing political process theory, he echoes
this view that judicial review must avoid judicial value imposition. He writes: "Until recently, originalists could claim the high
ground in debates about judicial restraint .... No more: Heller
and McDonald v. City of Chicago[, 130 S Ct 3020 (2010),] showed
originalism to be susceptible to the temptation of imposing judicial value judgments based on thin and shaky grounds" (p 68).
In Chapter 4, he criticizes the pragmatism of Judge Posner on
the ground that it authorizes judges to engage in "policymaking"
(p 95). His objection is that pragmatism causes courts to substitute their own judgments for those of elected officials and to become, in his words, "aggressive junior varsity legislator[s]" (p 88).
Judge Wilkinson's theory of judicial review thus can be
summarized in a few principles that he states throughout the
book:
(1) American democracy means majority rule.

41 See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
Yale L J 920, 935-36 (1973) ("What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected
right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions
they included, or the nation's governmental structure.").
42 See, for example, Michael H. v GeraldD., 491 US 110, 127-28 n 6 (1989) ("Although
assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges free to decide as they think best
when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular,
identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all").
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(2) Decisions by unelected judges declaring executive and
legislative actions unconstitutional are inconsistent with
majority rule.
(3) Judicial activism-implicitly defined as courts invalidating the acts of the elected branches of government-is bad.
Judges deciding cases on the basis of their own views and
preferences is bad.
(4) Judicial restraint-implicitly defined as courts upholding the acts of the elected branches of government-is good.
This is a theory of judicial review because it defines how
judges should decide constitutional cases. Indeed, Judge Wilkinson uses these principles-his theory of judicial review-as
the basis for criticizing decisions favored by both liberals and
conservatives, ranging from Roe v Wade to District of Columbia
v Heller to Citizens United v Federal Election Commission.4 Not
surprisingly, in each instance he is objecting to Supreme Court
decisions that declared government actions unconstitutional.
I am perplexed that Judge Wilkinson doesn't recognize that
he has, and throughout the book implicitly defends, a constitutional theory. I think it must be that it is so obvious to Judge
Wilkinson that democracy means majority rule and that judicial
review is incompatible with it that he therefore sees no need to
defend these premises. His objection to constitutional theory is
so great that he doesn't see that his book is arguing for one
based on great judicial deference to elected government officials.
But, of course, he must have a constitutional theory. Judges
must have some way of approaching the Constitution and of deciding when to declare the actions of the other branches of government unconstitutional. Even if the answer is never-and
Judge Wilkinson does not go that far (pp 109)-that is still a
constitutional theory.
III. THE FLAWS IN JUDGE WILKINSON'S CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY

The premises of Judge Wilkinson's analysis are familiar.
Long ago, Professor Alexander Bickel wrote of the "CounterMajoritarian Difficulty" and how judicial review is a "deviant

43

130 S Ct 876 (2010).
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institution" in American democracy.^ IMany of the constitutional
theories that Judge Wilkinson discusses-such as originalism
and process theory-begin with the premise that democracy
means majority rule and seek to reconcile judicial review with
democracy.4 6Judge
Wilkinson goes further in that he shows that
all theories of judicial review are inconsistent with democracy
defined as majority rule.
I have many disagreements with Judge Wilkinson's constitutional theory. First, Judge Wilkinson's emphasis on majoritarianism and judicial deference to the elected branches of government has no stopping point: Why have judicial review at all if
the highest value is deference to the choices of elected officials?
Why have judicial review at all if, as Judge Wilkinson argues,
elected officials are better equipped to determine the Constitution's meaning in modern circumstances and there are such
grave costs and dangers to judicial review? There are those who
have advanced such an approach, that courts should not have
the authority to overturn the decisions of elected officials and
that judicial review should be eliminated.46
Judge Wilkinson does not go this far, but it is not clear why
since that would seem to be the logical conclusion from his analysis. Judge Wilkinson provides and defends no role for the
courts.47 He explains what judges should not do-displace democratic self-governance-but never offers his account of when it is
permissible for courts to overturn the decisions of the elected
branches of government. An emphasis on majoritarianism by itself leads to the conclusion that there should not be any judicial

Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch at 16, 18 (cited in note 19).
See, for example, Perry, The Constitution,the Courts, and Human Rights at 9-10
(cited in note 12); Ely, Democracy and Distrust at vii (cited in note 12); Jack M. Balkin,
Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw U L Rev 549, 592 (2009);
Bork, 47 Ind L J at 3 (cited in note 25); Bork, The Tempting of America at 163 (cited in
note 12).
46 See, for example, Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts
154 (Princeton 1999); James MacGregor Burns, Packing the Court: The Rise of Judicial
Power and the Coming Crisisof the Supreme Court 252-53 (Penguin 2009).
47 But see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the UnravelingRule of
Law, 95 Va L Rev 253, 254-55 (2009):
44
45

But if any one theme emerges when looking at the role of the courts in American history, it is this: when the channels of democracy are functioning properly, judges should be modest in their ambitions and overrule the results of the
democratic process only where the constitution unambiguously commands it.
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review. 48 He does not argue for that, but he never explains why
that is not the appropriate conclusion from his premises.
In the last chapter, he praises the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown, Gideon v Wainwright,49 and Miranda v Arizona.50 He said that these are "success stories because they vindicated foundational principles essential to the functioning of our
nation" (p 111). In other words, Judge Wilkinson says that it is
permissible for courts to overturn democratic choices if they vindicate foundational principles essential to the functioning of the
nation. But he never defines what this means. What are "foundational principles" and which ones are "essential to the functioning of the nation"? Is it really essential to the functioning of
the nation that police give warnings before questioning suspects
in custody? The nation functioned, albeit tragically, before
Brown. In fact, Judge Wilkinson also provides a strong basis for
criticizing each of these decisions. He says in the last chapter,
"The more volatile the issue, the less justification there often is
for constitutionalizing it" (p 108). Few constitutional issues have
been more volatile than school desegregation, and Brown then
was seemingly wrongly decided according to Judge Wilkinson's
logic.
After identifying these few instances that he regards as the
successes of judicial review, he declares, "But I doubt there are
now Browns and Gideons waiting to be born" (p 111). If that is
so-if judicial review is justified only in cases like Brown and
Gideon, and these occasions no longer exist-then Judge Wilkinson really is calling for the elimination of judicial review.
Second, I disagree with the premise that democracy means
majority rule. The United States is a constitutional democracy;
the system of government created by it cannot be equated with
majority rule. The Constitution itself is profoundly antidemocratic.51 No one alive today participated in its drafting or ratification, and most of us did not have ancestors who did. Even if
the majority loathes it, or a part of it, that majority cannot
change it unless a supermajority (as reflected in an action of

48 See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution,
103 Harv L Rev 43, 96-97.
49 372 US 335 (1963).
50
384 US 436 (1966).
51
See Chemerinsky, Interpretingthe Constitution at ix (cited in note 12).
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two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-fourths of the
states) agrees. 2
Nor is this coincidental or incidental to the American Constitution. It is meant to put the country's most important commitments in a document that is very difficult to change.53 Indeed, so much of the Constitution was inherently
antimajoritarian. The president is chosen by the electoral college, not the popular vote.54 The members of the Senate were
chosen by state legislators.5@ Supreme Court justices and federal
judges are chosen by the president and confirmed by the Senate.5 6 Of the four institutions of the federal government, only
one, the House of Representatives, was elected by the people.57
In other words, Judge Wilkinson's error is in not recognizing
that it is the Constitution, rather than judicial review, that is
the deviant institution in a system where democracy is defined
as majority rule. By definition, any enforcement of the antimajoritarian constitution will be antimajoritarian.
In fact, if democracy is defined as majority rule, there never
will be a way to reconcile judicial review with democracy.
Whether the courts are following the Framers' intent or perfecting the process of government or adhering to traditions, it still
entails unelected judges invalidating choices made by elected
branches of government. This is why Judge Wilkinson is correct
that constitutional theory is on a futile quest if it seeks to reconcile judicial review with majoritarianism.
But if American democracy is defined not simply as majority
rule, but also as including the substantive values within the Constitution, then judicial review enforcing those values is actually
furthering democracy. I believe, as many do,58 that a preeminent
role of the Constitution is to protect minorities who cannot protect
themselves through the political process-whether they are unpopular individuals like criminal defendants, prisoners, dissidents, and enemy combatants, or racial minorities and groups
US Const Art V.
Professor Laurence Tribe explained this well when he said that the Constitution
is an elaborate edifice to make sure that society's short-term passions do not cause it to
lose sight of its long-term values. Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American ConstitutionalLaw 1012 (Foundation 2d ed 1988).
54 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 2.
55 US Const Art I, § 3, cl 1, amended by US Const Amend XVII.
6
US Const Art I, § 3, ci 1, amended by US Const Amend XVII.
57 US Const Art I, § 2, cl 1.
58
See, for example, Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 135 (cited in note 12); United
States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).
52
53
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that have been historically discriminated against. A crucial flaw
in Judge Wilkinson's approach to judicial review is that he fails
to recognize the dangers of unchecked majoritarianism. When is
the last time a legislature passed a law increasing the rights of
criminal defendants or prisoners or enemy combatants? It is
easy to romanticize self-government and democratic rule, but it
is precisely because of distrust of majoritarianism and a fear of
its excesses that the Constitution was adopted.60 Judge Wilkinson never even acknowledges this.
Finally, Judge Wilkinson is engaged in an impossible quest
to have judicial review without judges making value choices. In
deciding whether a government action violates equal protection
or infringes a constitutionally protected freedom, courts must
decide whether there is a "compelling" or an "important" or a
"legitimate" interest. Such a determination inevitably involves a
value choice by the judges. Deciding whether a search or an arrest is "reasonable," as the Fourth Amendment requires, necessitates a value choice.61 There is no such thing as value-neutral
judging and there never has been. In fact, even the choice to favor the decisions of the majority over the claims of constitutional
challenges is a value choice by the judges.62
CONCLUSION
For decades, justices and judges and constitutional scholars
have been in a debate over constitutional theory. I despair over
whether there is anything new or useful to say in the debate between originalism and nonoriginalism. It therefore is not
surprising for someone to come along and say that all of the constitutional theorizing has been unsuccessful.63
69 See, for example, Brown v Plata, 131 S Ct 1910, 1923 (2011) (ruling in favor of
releasing prisoners to remedy cruel and unusual punishment); Boumediene v Bush, 553
US 723, 771 (2008) (ruling in favor of Guantanamo detainees having access to habeas
corpus); Miranda, 384 US at 492 (ruling that criminal defendants must be advised of
their constitutional rights).
60
See Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist56, 61-62 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob
E. Cooke, ed).
61
See, for example, Safford Unified School District # 1 v Redding, 557 US 364, 379
(2009) (finding that strip searching a seventh grade student to find ibuprofen was
unreasonable).
62 See Sheri J. Engelken, Majoritarian Democracy in a Federalist System: The Late
Chief JusticeRehnquist and the FirstAmendment, 30 Harv J L & Pub Pol 695, 720 (2007).
63 Nor is Judge Wilkinson the first to object to constitutional theories. See, for example, William Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special Theories of JudicialReview, 35 U Fla L Rev 209, 233 (1983).
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But what is surprising is that the critique is based on a
simplistic definition of democracy as majority rule and a criticism of every theory as impermissibly having unelected judges
usurp the decisions of electorally accountable individuals. It is a
critique that leaves no role for judicial review, but the elimination (or near elimination) of judicial review is never defended.
Judge Wilkinson is surely right: a cosmic constitutional theory to reconcile judicial review with majority rule is impossible.
But the lesson to be drawn is that he-and so much of constitutional theory-has been asking the wrong question. After all,
long ago, Professor Bickel realized that "[n]o answer is what the
wrong question begets."64

64

Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 103 (cited in note 19).

